



Structural Change in Transition: A Role for Organizational Legitimacy? 




Jarmila Curtiss, Bernhard Brümmer, Tomáš Medonos, Robert D. Weaver* 
 
* Respectively, Research Fellow at the Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Halle, Germany, Assistant Professor at Institute of Agricultural Economics, 
George August Universität Göttingen, Germany, Research Fellow at the Institute for Agricultural 






06120 Halle (Saale), Germany 









Paper prepared for presentation at the 11th Congress of the EAAE  
(European Association of Agricultural Economists),  
‘The Future of Rural Europe in the Global Agri-Food System’, Copenhagen, Denmark, 






Copyright 2005 by Jarmila Curtiss, Bernhard Brümmer, Tomáš Medonos, Robert D. Weaver.  All 
rights reserved.  Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial 
purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN TRANSITION: A ROLE FOR 










Market liberalization in Central and Eastern Europe was targeted at establishing incentives that would 
improve economic performance. While substantial reorganization of enterprises is observed, firms can 
also be observed which devote resources towards establishing organizational legitimacy. Motivations for 
such behavior are considered and empirical evidence of its relationship with technical efficiency using a 
distance function approach is analyzed for the case of Czech agriculture. Contrary to the expectation that 
such behavior would be inefficient, we find that firms reap private economic gains from legitimacy efforts 
through improved access to agricultural land, investment subsidies and firm internal social capital. 
However, its effect on technical efficiency depends on whether such legitimacy efforts are valued by 
stakeholders or understood as a norm. Evidence of the trade-off between gains or sustainability from 
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  1. Introduction  
  
The processes of price and market liberalization and restoration of property rights in agricultural 
sectors in post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe were expected to result in economic 
incentives that would stimulate farm restructuring and improve farm-level economic performance. 
Nonetheless, empirical efficiency analyses have shown that ten or more years after the economic system 
change, a variety of organizational forms continue to survive despite  substantial technical inefficiency 
(see Thiele and Brodersen, 1999; Mathijs and Swinnen, 2001; Curtiss, 2002; Davidova et al., 2003; 
Latruffe et al., 2003). Theories as well as the empirical studies have considered organizational forms, 
scale, and scope though results have been inconclusive concerning which organizational form might be 
best for agricultural production. Studies of structural change have often attributed observed technical 
inefficiency to rigidities or constrained reorganization possibly arising from transaction costs or 
heterogeneity across the institutional conditions (Schlüter 2001; Brem 2001).   
 
In this paper we consider an alternative explanation for these observations. In particular, we consider 
the role of persistent social norms and values that may continue to support incentives for firms to devote 
resources and effort toward achieving a state of organizational legitimacy, i.e. a condition for congruence 
or consistency between societal perception of the firm and social norms and values. Where achievement of 
such a state pays off for firms, within this generalized context devotion of resources toward that end may 
be economically efficient. We hypothesize that organizational legitimacy is associated with economic 
gains which, in the transitional settings, allow legitimacy to be a complement to purely private efficiency 
as a strategic goal for survival of an organization. In such a case, gains from organizational legitimacy 
provide incentives to choose effort, activities, or organizational forms that appear inefficient from a purely 
private good perspective.    
 
As an empirical setting, we consider the case of Czech agriculture. We note that a significant share of 
farms in transition have continued to provide activities and services that generate on a local basis public 
benefit. This provision occurs despite associated direct and indirect costs. Given the value structure among 
rural population, we hypothesize that such behavior is motivated by a strategy for attainment of 
organizational legitimacy. Within this context, we present a theory and assess empirical evidence to 
explain how farms that pursue organizational legitimacy goals could survive in a competitive 
environment.  We also consider characteristics of firms that exhibit such behavior. In short, we reconsider 
effort to secure organizational legitimacy and evaluate its implications for economic efficiency.    
  
2. Theoretical Framework  
  
2.1. Concept of Organizational Legitimacy and Efficiency  
  
The concept of organizational legitimacy has a long history where it has been considered within a 
wide scope of disciplinary literature, see e.g. early work by Weber (1968) or Parsons (1960). The linkage 
between legitimacy and organizational behaviour was considered early on by Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) 
and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). More recent neoinstitutional literature follows this framework clarifying 
that in some social, political, and economic contexts the firm may find it feasible to earn proprietary value 
through application of inputs to activities that do not contribute directly to private good production 
processes, see e.g. Ruef and Scott (1998) who draw on Meyer and Rowan (1977). We follow the 
conventional definition here where organization legitimacy is defined as a consistency or congruence 
between the firm’s behavior and social norms, values, or beliefs, see e.g. Suchman (1995). We emphasize 
two theoretical aspects of the concept by considering (a) how the firm’s behavior directed at managing the 
state of its organizational legitimacy affects economic efficiency and (b) how achievement of legitimacy 
affects economic efficiency.   
  
2.2. Organizational Legitimacy and Production Possibilities    
Define x as a vector of variable private good inputs managed by the firm.  We assume these inputs 
are applied to a private good production technology conditioned by flows from a vector of quasi-fixed 
inputs, θ , to produce a vector of private good outputs, y . To introduce the possibility of the firm 
attempting to manage its organizational legitimacy, we note that the firm may also apply its inputs ( x, θ ) 
to produce a vector of what we label as organizational legitimacy effort, z.  Any such production plan is 
viewed as generating a vector of local or quasi-public goods, s, as well as a contribution to organizational 
legitimacy. The translation of such effort into organizational legitimacy is clearly complex and highly 
conditioned by the social context. We suppose that at any time a firm can be described as having a 
particular state of organizational legitimacy, noted by a vector q. This level of organizational legitimacy is 
likely to follow from both current and past effort. The characteristics of the firm that might be included in 
this vector will vary from one social context to another.    
 
We view the process of producing organizational legitimacy as possibly joint with the production 
process.  For the ith firm at time t, these notions are summarized in the following production possibilities 
functions for which we assume typical neoclassical properties:   
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From this specification, it is clear the firm may be motivated to produce organizational legitimacy if its 
production generates proprietary value for the firm in one of two ways. First, production of the local 
public good s may have proprietary effects conditioning the productivity of the other inputs to render 
returns collectible through sale of y.  In the simplest case where the public good is not valued by local 
society, the firm may place no value on the state of its organizational legitimacy, though may find it 
optimal to implement a production plan to produce positive s. A second case of interest would occur when 
the firm perceives that it can harvest proprietary value from the state q
t. To consider this, we specify the 
following valuation processes for the firm’s outputs. First, we assume the private goods in the vector y
t 
can be sold on markets prices in the vector, p
t , while inputs x
t can be purchase at prices r
t.; and inputs z
t 
for prices w
t. Second, we assume that the firm’s state of organizational legitimacy is valued by society.  
This valuation could take the form of access to rights or privileges, or subsidies in the form of flows or 
grants of assets or access to assets.  In the Czech agricultural setting, this social valuation may follow from 
access to land, government loans, or higher quality labor.  In any event, we define the current proprietary 
value derived from the firm’s organizational legitimacy as:   
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We assume this valuation function is strictly concave in q
t though in the economically relevant range 
considered in this setting, we assume ∂v / ∂qt ⎜q = 0 > 0.  We note that it is likely that this valuation 
function varies by social setting, e.g. by locale, though to maintain a simple though sufficient notation, we 
omit such notation in the current specification.    
 
In a static setting, this specification suggests that a firm managed by purely hedonistic managers may 
find it optimal to devote private inputs to produce organizational legitimacy.  This might occur as a subsidiary effect of the use of private inputs x
t or as a result of application of dedicated inputs z
t .  
Importantly, such effort will shift the frontier faced by firm’s dedicating effort to organizational 
legitimacy compared to that faced by firm’s that do not apply such effort.  Consider the simple case where 
the firm’s objective is to maximize profits defined as:   
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Within this notation, it is of interest to establish conditions under which the firm would devote resources 
to managing organizational legitimacy.  Suppose society places no value on organizational legitimacy, i.e. 
v(q
t ) = 0 ∀ q
t.  Given that z
t contributes no productivity to y
t, the firm would set z
t = 0.   By comparison, 
it is clear that for v > 0, dedicated effort in the form of application of inputs z to change the state of 
organizational legitimacy would depend on the firm’s perception of its marginal contribution to current 
and future payoffs of v relative to its cost.  For our purposes, it is sufficient to consider the simple static 
case where Equation (2) is written:   
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In this case, the first-order conditions for the firm’s choice are (omitting the time subscript):  
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Two effects are important to note.  From these conditions, it is clear that the firm will simultaneously 
consider the application of x and z.  Importantly, where organizational legitimacy is positively valued and 
, if x contributes to q, i.e. if  0 > ∂ ∂ q / v 0 > ∂ ∂ x / q , then application of x will be increased relative to the 
case where  .  Further, considering the optimal level of z, we see a basis for hypothesizing that 
within the Czech setting, as local conditions implied positive or zero local social valuation of the 
organizational legitimacy, two distinct sets of firms could be observed: 1) those that pursue organizational 
legitimacy and 2) those that do not.   Within the first group, it follows that the position of the production 
frontier will be conditioned by the levels of organizational legitimacy effort applied by each firm.  More 
generally, Equations (6) highlight the conditions under which z > 0 will involve consideration of all 
choices made by the firm and the interaction of the elements of the production plan.  In general, the 
following rule would hold:  
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where  .  Thus, we can expect organizational 
legitimacy effort to be devoted by firms when society-based pay-off is expected, and depending on the 
productivity of such effort z in generating that pay-off.  From Equation (7), it is clear that where 
 the choice of organizational legitimacy effort is independent of the choice of private good 
inputs and outputs.  In variations of this problem, limited managerial time might be added to highlight 
trade-offs between private good production and organizational legitimacy effort.  From another 
perspective, the productivity of the x inputs could be reduced by application of organizational legitimacy 
effort, z. Together, these results motivate the hypothesis that the production frontier for Equation (1) will 
envelop the frontiers associated with particular levels of organizational legitimacy effort.  Thus, for a 
sample of firms, we would expect that while they face a common frontier such as Equation (1), the levels 
of their ol effort will imply they will be operating with a integrated private good and social value frontier 
that falls within that common frontier.    
) z | q ( v x ' r y ' p max solve y , x t t t t t t y , x 0
0 0 = + − ≡ π
0
2 = ∂ ∂ ∂ x z / q
  
3. Methodology  
 
Agricultural production is generally characterized by a technology which transforms multiple inputs into 
multiple outputs. This holds in particular for the larger enterprises in Czech agriculture. An appropriate 
framework, which explicitly takes multi-output production into account, is the modelling on an output 
distance function (Shephard, 1970), which has been the microeconomic foundation of most of the work in 
non-parametric production analyses. However, the approach is also applicable in a stochastic frontier 
analysis approach, which is better suited for agricultural data in our view. The output-oriented distance 
function can be defined based on the output set P(x) as  () () { } x y y x P DO ∈ > = φ φ
φ : 0 inf ,  for all x ∈ ℜ+
K 
(see, e.g., Färe and Primont, 1995, p. 11). DO(x,y) is a non-decreasing, convex, and linearly homogeneous 
function in the output vector y, and a non-increasing and quasi-convex function in the input vector x. The 
value of the output distance function is exactly the inverse of the Farrell measure of output technical 
efficiency, which explains the large popularity of this dual representation of the production technology in 
the efficiency literature. The distance function can be conveniently transformed to have the same 
composed error structure as the standard stochastic production frontier, once linear homogeneity in 
outputs is imposed. Consider a translog functional form for the distance frontier (i.e., ln DO=0) in K inputs 
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Linear homogeneity can be imposed by arbitrarily choosing one output (e.g., yM) as a divisor for all 
remaining outputs. In terms of the natural logarithms in equation (8), after bringing the divisor to the right 
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         (9) 
 
 
Denote the output oriented Farrell efficiency measure TEO with exp(u), where u is a non-negative random 
variable. This implies that ln DO =1/TEO = -u. Multiplication by (-1), rearranging terms and adding an 
additional random variable v to account for unsystematic deviations from the production frontier gives the 
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             (10) 
 
 
Estimation of (10) by maximum likelihood requires distributional assumptions for both the white noise 
error v and the technical inefficiency error term u because only the composed error term e = v – u can be 
estimated. The variables v are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) normal 
random variables with a mean of zero and constant variance σv
2 independent of the u’s. The systematic 
deviations from the frontier u are assumed to be i.i.d. half-normal random variables with a mean of zero 
and a heteroskedastic (i.e., firm-specific) variance parameter of σu
2, independently distributed from the v’s. 
This latter specification was initially proposed by Caudill et al. (1995) as a correction in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity. Wang and Schmidt (2002) point out that the variables, which explain the 
heteroskedasticity in the systematic error term can also be interpreted as determinants of technical 
efficiency. Hence, we use this model to analyze the role of organizational legitimacy effort as a 
determinant of technical efficiency, so that technical inefficiency effects are explicitly expressed as a 
function of a vector of firm-specific via the variance parameter σu
2:   
 
) exp( δ σ i u z
i =                                                                   (11) 
 
where zi denotes the row vector of dimension p of firm-specific variables (including an intercept 
term), which may influence the efficiency of the i-th firm, and δ is a p-dimensional column vector of 
parameters to be estimated. The parameters of the frontier distance function and the heteroskedastic 
inefficiency model are obtained by the maximization of the relevant likelihood function. The nonlinear 
maximization is performed in Ox 3.40 (Doornik, 2002).  
  
4. Data and Choice of Variables  
  
The data set analyzed for legitimacy-seeking behavior consists of 166 agricultural enterprises from an 
extensive survey conducted in 2004 by the Institute for Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern 
Europe (IAMO) and by the Research Institute for Agricultural Economics in Prague (VUZE) in the Czech 
Republic. For most of these enterprises farm accountancy data for the years 2001 to 2003, collected by VUZE, are available. The analysis concentrates on legal entities, which represent larger enterprises, since 
legitimacy-seeking behavior has, among these enterprises, enjoyed a long tradition and is still more 
probable and feasible than on family farms. Due to an incomplete panel of data and some missing 
information in the qualitative survey on public good provision and other legitimacy-gaining efforts, the 
final sample used includes 326 observations - 106 for 2001, 113 for 2002, and 107 for 2003, respectively.  
 
4.3. Accountancy Data – Data for the Stochastic Production Function Specification  
  
Accountancy data for the years 2001-2003 are used to specify the stochastic frontier production 
model. The firms in the sample are classified as agricultural enterprises with combined crop and animal 
production. They have various legal forms – Limited Companies, Joint Stock Companies, and 
Cooperatives. Despite the fact that legal entities are mostly considered large scale farms, they significantly 
vary in their size. The statistics in Table 3 show that the smallest legal entities, when measured by 
revenues, comprise only 2% of the largest firms in the sample. The data are aggregated into three output 
variables (M = 3) defined as total revenue from Crop, Livestock and Non-Agricultural Production, and 
four input variables (K = 4) – Labor Expenses (x1), Land (multiplied by farm averaged paid land rent) (x2), 
Capital (x3), and Intermediate Consumption (x4). Mostly cost data is available for production inputs, thus 
no breakdown between quantity and prices is possible. To keep the indication of output quantity and input 
equipment comparable over time, the input data expressed in value terms have to be transformed to a 
constant price basis. Price indices for agricultural output and inputs were used to bring the production 
(revenue) and expenditure data to constant 2001 terms.  
  
The variable Crop Production (y1) consists of revenues from crop production, including intermediary, 
store change and loss compensation from insurance. Livestock Production (y2) as the second output 
variable is defined as revenues from livestock production. The variable Non-Agricultural Production (y3) 
consists of revenues from non-agricultural production and services and subsidies for countryside 
maintenance. All input variables are expressed in expenses in constant 2001 prices, although information 
on total working hours, land use, and animal livestock units is available. In this way, the farms' ability to 
produce and also to acquire resources (and in the case of output, to market production) is considered. 
Thus, the variable Labor Expenses includes wages as well as social contributions paid for farm employees, 
Land is expressed as total cultivated land multiplied by the average rent price paid by the farm. In this 
way, quality of land is also partially considered. Capital is expressed in asset depreciations, including the 
depreciation of breeding herds. Intermediate Consumption consists of materials for agricultural production 
such as fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, energy, services, materials for non-agricultural production, use 
of own intermediary and others. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the distance function model data 
Variables in 1,000 CZK     Mean  Std. Dev.  Min   Max 
Crop Production   y
1
   26,356.6 23,837.1  315.0  161,983.2 
Livestock Production    y
2 31,724.0 21,609.3  1,921.0  119,352.0 
Non-Agricultural Production    y
3 11,452.0 14,600.1  45.0  101,604.0 
Labor expenses    x
1 15,502.7 10,540.2  3,349.3    66,885.0 
Land   x
2 974.2 1,334.1  14.0    10,380.0 
Capital   x
3 6,423.9 4,505.9  107.0    26,516.0 
Intermediate Consumption  x
4 44,695.0 33,241.1  5,562.6    183,979.0 
   
 
 4.1. Organizational Legitimacy Variables  
  
The 2004 survey concerned farms’ activities which were assumed to be reactions to various values or 
norms in their societal environment, which in the case of agriculture is represented by a high share of 
active shareholders. Thus, these activities mostly comprised the provision of public or semi-public (local) 
goods of a value not for anonymous individuals, but rather local non-agricultural actors, often holders of 
the farms’ shares
1, employees and other potential workers, land owners, other agricultural actors possibly 
interested in collective action and policy makers on the regional and state level. The statistics of the data 
on the provision of public goods and other variables that proxy legitimacy-gaining efforts are summarized 
in Table 2. 
 
The first variable, “Social Employment”, should proxy the effort of gaining local support and 
represents whether the agricultural enterprise employs some workers for social reasons; the data reveals 
that 60% of enterprises still do so. The variable “Publicly Beneficial Activities” represents the enterprise’s 
initiative in providing publicly beneficial activities for the municipality or dwellers, such as maintenance 
or arrangement of villages and roads or public facilities. Only 23% of the informants do not participate in 
any publicly beneficial activities for the municipality or local inhabitants. The next variable, “Social Role 
of Non-Agricultural Activities”, implies that from 81% of the sampled enterprises active in non-
agricultural productions, more than half are active in this sector for mainly or partially social reasons. 
These activities consist, for example, of catering facilities for workers and elderly people in the 
community, bus transportation for workers and others, etc. Almost 80% of enterprises organize 
themselves or participate in the organization of cultural actions. This is captured in the variable “Cultural 
Activities”. The variable “Publicity of Social Concerns” should indicate the effort of the enterprises to 
publicize their social and cultural concerns, especially to the most important or powerful actors in the 
community, thereby achieving higher legitimacy. This is approximated by the question of whether the 
enterprise invites municipality or town representatives to the company’s cultural and social activities.   
 
The next group of variables includes information on the enterprises' efforts to obtain collective and 
political support through membership in an association or interest group. As the group supplies goods to 
their members (extension programs, information provision, etc.) and also public goods accessible to non-
members (general policies through participating and lobbying in political negotiations), members gain not 
only legitimate access to the collective goods, but are from the social perspective also eligible to the 
public goods. Being considered a free-rider among farms can be viewed as a behavior that decreases 
organizational legitimacy. Membership in the agrarian organization, Agricultural Association, is captured 
in the variable “Association Membership”. As the second variable “Association Initiative” suggests, 
almost 40% of all observed enterprises are actively involved in the management and design of this 
association  through regional offices. This position, when compared to regular membership, allows, in 
addition to better and faster reaction to collective values, participation in shaping new societal values
2. 
The variable “Participation in the Association’s Activities” indicates that half of the members attend 
association activities such as extension programs, discussions with members and politicians and 
information meetings with input suppliers more than 6 times a year.  
 
                                                 
1 This is especially due to the privatization process in former collective farms, where former employees became 
eligible for transformation shares of these farms. 
2 In the case of association activities in transition, active members can, e.g. publicize the importance of agriculture in 
rural areas to legitimize subsidies, or communicate the perception of importance of large “socialist” style agricultural 
enterprises and thus influence public perception of the need for organizational change and strong restitution of 
injustices which occurred during socialist times. Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the legitimacy data  
Variables   Mean   Min   Max   Description (frequencies)  
Aiming for Local Support   
Social Employment   0.60   0   1   Yes = 1 (60%), No = 0 (40%)  
Publicly Beneficial 
Activities  
0.77   0   1   Yes = 1 (77%), No = 0 (23%)  
Social Role of Non-
Agricultural Activities  
0.98   0   2   Non-agricultural activities have: mainly social function = 2 
(7%), partially social function = 1 (39%), purely economic 
function  or purely agricultural activities = 0 (54%) 
Cultural Activities   0.78  0   1  Provision YES = 1 (78%), never = 0 (22%)  
Publicity of Social 
Concerns  
0.40   0   1   Inviting town representatives to company’s cultural and social 
activities: Yes = 1 (40%), No = 0 (60%)  
Aiming for Collective (identical interest group) and Political Support  
Association 
Membership  
0.79   0   1   Yes = 1 (79%); No = 0 (21%)  
Association Initiative   0.38   0   1   Yes = 1 (38%); No = 0 (62%)  
Participation in the 
Association’s 
Activities  
2.18   0   4   More than 10 times a year = 4 (17%), 6-10 times = 3 (23%), 2-
5 times = 2 (32%), once a year = 1 (7%), not members = 0 
(21%)  
Aiming for Workers’ support and reputation  
Workers’ Wage   14.89  5.26  24.48  Standard deviation = 0.11; in 1,000 CZK  
Land Rent Price   563   60   2,000   Standard deviation = 400  
EU Standards   0.59   0   1   Fulfillment of technological EU standards: Yes = 1 (58%), No 
= 0 (42%)  
Access to Resources  
Own Land   0.03   0   1   Standard deviation = 0.11  
Investment Subsidies   810   0   10,741   Standard deviation = 1,541  
Work Ethic   1.12   0   3   No problem = 0 (22%), slight problem = 1 (48%), mid 
problem = 2 (27%), high problem = 3 (3%)   
Workers’ Loyalty   1.30   0   3   No problem = 0 (21%), slight problem = 1 (36%), mid 
problem = 2 (35%), high problem = 3 (8%)  
Workers Respect for 
Management  
0.79   0   2   No problem = 0 (35%), slight problem = 1 (51%), mid 
problem = 2 (14%)  
Enterprise and Management Characteristics  
Workers’ Evaluation   2.80   1   4   Yes = 4 (7%), rather yes = 3 (69%), rather no = 2 (22%), no = 
1 (2%)  
Investment Intensity   2.24   1   4   investment did not cover depreciations = 1 (25%), 2 (39%), 3 
(22%), highly expending investment = 4 (13%).  
Investment Subsidies   810   0   10,741   Standard deviation = 1,541  
Size   71,602   5,903  189,487  Standard deviation = 34,934  
  
 
The third group of variables listed in Table 2 aims to capture the enterprises’ concerns with, and 
reactions to, the workers' values and the enterprises' reputation. Generally high performance and 
investments into the enterprise and its workers, as well as conformity with regulations, law and societal 
concerns are valued by the workers. We use three variables with the objective of covering some of the 
mentioned aspects. These are: “Workers’ Wage”,  “Land Rent Price”,  and “EU Standards”. Generally, the 
wages paid to agricultural workers are markedly below the national average (around 70% of the national 
average). The statistics on the categories of gross average monthly wage paid to a worker in the drawn 
sample (variable “Workers’ Wage” in Table 1) show that there are significant differences between enterprises in paying their workers. The average monthly gross is around 15,000 Czech Crowns (CZK) 
including social contributions, which is slightly less than 500 Euro. The reason for low wages in 
agriculture is mainly the difficult financial situation of the enterprises due to low market prices, low state 
support, and low economic performance. Also, Land Rent Prices are not given by the land rent market but 
mostly set by the enterprises themselves (at least within a certain quality interval). Since the average land 
rent price in the Czech Republic is considered low, enterprises freely offering higher land rent prices show 
concerns with land owners and thus could benefit from a willingness to negotiate in the case of an 
intended transaction. The last variable, “EU Standards”, which represents preliminary investments in EU 
technological standards, is mostly concerned with animal welfare and ecology and can be understood as  
partially motivated by the increase of reputation. We hypothesize that all these variables will relate to 
better shareholder attitudes towards the enterprise – e.g. higher social capital, or consumer preferences for 
the enterprise's production. 
 
The remaining variables in Table 2 should contribute to the explanation of the efficiency effect of the 
legitimacy effort variables. The variable “Own Land” describes the share of land owned by the enterprise. 
The survey indicated that enterprises have a high interest in purchasing land. Hence, the low percentage 
share of own land (3%) indicates low land owners’ willingness to sell their land. The following three 
variables, “Work ethic”, “Workers’ Loyalty”, and “Workers Respect to Management”, describe the 
workers' attitude to the enterprise and should proxy problems of moral hazard or social capital. “Workers’ 
Evaluation” indicates the managers’ perception of whether wages paid to workers correspond to their 
work effort/efficiency and qualification. This variable should thus proxy managerial quality. Furthermore, 
“Investment Intensity” is chosen to provide information on farm performance. Lastly, “Size” is defined by 
revenues and should, besides the size of production, also reflect the degree of reorganization, since the 
largest enterprises mostly retained their pre-transition form.       
  
4.2. Choice of Organizational Legitimacy Effort Variables 
  
We can assume that enterprises seeking legitimacy on the local level will likely be involved in all 
three of the following activities: social employment, provision of publicly beneficial activities and cultural 
activities. Therefore, a high correlation among some variables representing legitimacy efforts is expected. 
We carry out a principal component analysis to explore the latent dimensions and constructs in the 
original variables. In general, the component factor analysis transforms the correlation matrix through the 
estimation of a factor model into a factor matrix. Due to the discrete (ordinal) character of most variables, 
we use non-parametric Kendell’s Tau estimates to generate the correlation matrix for the factor analysis. 
To test the sampling adequacy of individual variables, we use the Anti-Image Correlation Measures of 
Sampling Adequacy and communalities, which led to the exclusion of two variables from the analysis. 
These are "Publicly Beneficial Activities" and "Social Employment". This indicates that these variables do 
not sample well with other efforts for legitimacy variables and thus can be individually applied in 
forthcoming analyses. The sampling adequacy of the remaining variables in the component analysis is 
high, which is indicated by the 0.627 value of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure. Using the Latent root 
criterion (each factor explains at least the variance of one variable), we identified four factors. These are 
presented in Table 3. In the presented solution, the relative explanatory power of the estimated five factors 
is 6 variables, which implies that they explain 65.7 % of the total variance of the 9 variables. The index for 
this solution is thus sufficiently high (min. 60 %) and the variables are in fact highly related to one 
another. The interpretation of the unrotated factor matrix is, in general, extremely difficult and 
theoretically less meaningful. Therefore, we proceed to the factor matrix rotation, which simplifies the 
interpretation. The Varimax solution is chosen for the factor analysis result solution.  
    
The loadings of the variables on the individual factors shown in Table 3 imply that information 
contained in the variables could be substituted by four uncorrelated variables – factoral scores. Since the 
analysis mostly deals with discrete variables, it is not possible to use factorial scores to develop new 
variables representing the detected factors. Hence, we choose surrogate variables representing detected groups of significantly correlated variables. Variables with the highest factor loadings - Participation in 
Association’s Activities, Publicity of Social Concerns, EU Standards and Workers’ Wage - will be used in 
the analysis of the efficiency effect of organizational legitimacy. 
 
Table 3. Rotated factor matrix with effort for legitimacy variables  
    Component 1  Component 2  Component 3  Component 4 
Participation in Association’s  Activities   .869  .028 .018 -.099 
Association Membership   .847  -.001 .078 .102 
Association Initiative   .605  .043 .478 .056 
Publicity of Social Concerns  -.121  .804  .182 -.020 
Cultural Activities  .137  .741  -.184 -.020 
EU Standards  -.063 .162 -.685  .108 
Social Role of Non-Agricultural Activities  .165 .403 .652  .133 
Workers’ Wage  -.168 -.125 .192  .806 
Land Rent Price  .222 .107 -.258 .719 
  
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1. Analyzing means of legitimacy effect 
 
In the following, we analyze the relationship of the effort for legitimacy variables to other farm 
characteristics and access to resources to elaborate the possible efficiency effect of these variables. Table 
4 reports these relationships in a form of non-parametric Kendall’s Tau correlations. Note that these 
correlations do not determine any causal directions in the analyzed relationship but should help to 
formulate hypotheses if, and by which means the chosen effort for legitimacy variables could influence 
farm efficiency. Most of the correlations are relatively weak, which could partially be the effect of dealing 
with mostly ordinal variables. Nevertheless, the whole range of the correlations are statistically 
significant. 
 
Table 4. Kendall’s tau correlations between legitimacy effort variables and enterprise characteristics  












Own Land   0.191**   0.162*  0.130  0.147*  0.071   -0.187** 
Investment Subsidies   0.098   0.082  0.200**  0.265**  0.086   -0.018 
Working Moral   0.154*   0.086  0.000  -0.123  -0.085   -0.182* 
Workers’ Loyalty   0.057   -0.03  -0.057  -0.079  -0.158*   -0.035 
Respect for Management   0.203**   0.143*  -0.018  -0.136*  -0.135   -0.178* 
Workers’ Evaluation   -0.017   -0.046  0.053  0.048  0.081   0.166* 
Investment Intensity   0.036   0.028  -0.026  0.143*  0.160*   0.160* 
Size   0.047   0.187*  0.159*  0.322**  0.125   0.018 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level, * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level  
 
The significant correlations imply that enterprises responding to community values by employing 
workers and carrying out non-agricultural productions and services for social reasons have a significantly 
higher share of own land than other enterprises. This could imply that they had better access to scarce 
resources, since there is a high demand for land purchased for agricultural use in the Czech Republic, but 
low supply on the side of owners of restituted land. This finding, and its suggestion of a lower cost of 
transactions on local input markets, supports the positive effect of social activities on farm efficiency. 
However, enterprises which show higher social concerns have larger problems with workers' work ethic and respect for management, which is generally, and also in this case, a problem of larger enterprises. This 
would support our hypothesis that enterprises which inherited experience, and likely also equipment for 
the provision of social and public goods, chose to seek gains from legitimacy rather than to reorganize and 
eliminate their internal organizational problems. 
 
Furthermore, being active in the management of agricultural associations, as is mostly the case in 
larger enterprises, brings advantages (likely information advantages); in our case, with respect to access to 
investment subsidies. Also, enterprises paying higher land rent prices obtain more investment subsidies. In 
this case, it is less likely to be a result of information advantages (land rent price does not correlate with 
association activity), but rather a result of the farms’ larger scale. However, paying higher land rent prices 
and wages to the workers seems to have an effect on workers’ respect for management and workers’ 
loyalty to the farm. Investment in EU technological standards also relates to more effective workers’ 
evaluation techniques and overall higher investment activity. Also these activities seem to have a positive 
effect on social capital since they relate to higher workers’ effort and respect for management. 
Nevertheless, investing in technological standards is costly, with limited productive effect, thus its effect 
on technical efficiency is, despite its possible positive effect on social capital, ambiguous. The positive 
effect of such preliminary investment could reveal itself once EU technological standards become the 
norm and hence a liability for all producers. 
  
5.2. Results from Distance Function Application 
 
Results from the estimation of the translog
3 distance function for Czech agricultural producers during 
2001-2003 are reported in Table 4. As explained in Section 3, we imposed linear homogeneity on outputs. 
In addition, we estimated the parameters of the specified model in such a way that the estimated functions 
satisfy the following properties implied by production theory: monotonicity – non-increasing in inputs and 
non-decreasing in outputs; and curvature – quasi-convex in inputs and convex in outputs. Furthermore, we 
normalized all the variables by their respective geometric mean. In this way, the translog form represents 
the approximation around the geometric mean. Thus, the technological properties are easily interpretable 
from the first-order parameters. These indicate average partial output elasticities with respect to respective 
outputs and inputs. 
 
The T-probabilities in Table 4 show that all first-order effects are statistically significant. Given the 
model specification in equation 10, partial output elasticities with respect to inputs and outputs have the 
correct sign. The slightly higher elasticity with respect to the share of livestock production rather reflects 
the higher share of livestock production of total revenues than the share of crop production. Considering 
the homogeneity constraint in outputs, the share of non-agricultural production is low. The output 
elasticities with respect to inputs imply that additional input quantities increase the output. The largest 
proportional contribution to output, while keeping other inputs constant, comes from intermediate 
consumption. This could relate to the fact that the intensity of using variable inputs such as fertilizers is 
relatively low, which results from the economizing measures employed during transition due to low farm 
current resources. Therefore, an additional unit of intermediates (contrary to labor and capital) still has a 
high production potential. Scale elasticity as the sum of the output elasticities with respect to inputs is not 
significantly different from the indicated constant returns to scale in the sample mean. However, when 
                                                 
3 Tests of the model specification rejected the restriction of the translog functional form to a Cobb-Douglas form. We 
use a likelihood ratio test to examine evidence that supports simplification of the translog to a Cobb-Douglas model. 
The logarithm value of the likelihood function for the translog model is 232.4, while for the Cobb-Douglas function 
it is 203.7. The likelihood ratio value is 57.4, which is higher than critical χ
2
 value 30.6 for 15 degrees of freedom 
and a 0.01significance level. This implies that the null hypothesis, β
jk = 0, j = k = 1,..5, can be rejected at the 0.01 
significance level. Using the same test procedure, we reject the hypotheses that the stochastic error is symmetric and 
invariant across observations, and that technical inefficiency varies across enterprises. This supports the use of a 
frontier model instead of a traditional production function with a normally distributed error term. tested globally, returns to scale did not prove to be constant in all points of the production frontier. 
 
Estimated technical efficiency is demonstrated in Figure 1. There, observations are sequenced by the 
score of technical efficiency. Considering the average technical efficiency estimates, over 80% of farms 
produce with an efficiency higher than 0.9, and are thus relatively close to their production potential. The 
relatively narrow confidence interval of these estimates indicates their relatively high reliability. These 
high efficiency values could be given by the high flexibility of the production frontiers in the multiple-
output space.    
 
Next, we focus on interpreting the parameterization of the error structure to consider how legitimacy 
efforts may influence technical efficiency. The negative value of these estimates indicates their negative 
effect on revenue inefficiency (positive effect on efficiency). The parameter δ
1 in the inefficiency effect 
model indicates that paying higher wages increases technical efficiency. This indicates that the costs of 
gaining organizational legitimacy through higher wages are exceeded by the resulting economic gains, in 
this case, possibly realized through the improvement of social capital.  The second parameter in the 
inefficiency effect model, however, indicates that the effect of high paid wages is lost in highly labor 
intensive productions
4. Being active in agricultural associations is also found to reduce technical 
inefficiency. On the other hand, publicity of social concerns, which also represents a group of variables 
regarding the farms’ social and cultural activities, does not reduce technical inefficiency. Indeed, we find 
that it significantly increases technical inefficiency. In the context of the analysis in section 5.1., this 
would suggest that farms which more or less retained their former organizational structure provide this 
type of public goods to secure their stakeholders' support and their organizational legitimacy without a 
particular economic gain. In the case of such farms, the provision of public goods could be strongly 
expected by their stakeholders, who are often simultaneously shareholders. Furthermore, despite its 
possible effect on reputation, preliminary investment into EU technological standards does not prove to 
have a positive effect on technical efficiency. This effect could arrive when all farms are obliged to meet 
these technological standards. In relation to the results in Table 4, which suggest that investment into EU 
technological standards is realized by more reorganized enterprises, the efficiency results imply that these 
farms forgo current gains from legitimacy and choose to secure their future competitiveness with efficient 
managerial practices and technological investments.  
                                                 
4 Variable labor intensity is measured as a share of labor expenses from the total expenses of total farm production. Table 5. Estimates of translog stochastic production frontier  
Distance function    Parameter   Std.deviation   t-prob  
Intercept  α
0   0.057 0.015 0.000 
Ln Y1/Y3 β
1   0.417 0.018 0.000 
Ln Y2/Y3 β
2   0.491 0.019 0.000 
Ln Labor    γ
1   -0.173 0.040 0.000 
Ln Land    γ
2   -0.043 0.012 0.000 
Ln Capital    γ
3   -0.063 0.029 0.036 
Ln Intermediate Consumption (IC)  γ
4   -0.722 0.039 0.000 
(Ln Y1/Y3)
2 β
11   0.255 0.025 0.000 
(Ln Y2/Y3)
2 β
22   0.251 0.035 0.000 
(Ln Y1/Y3) x (Ln Y2/Y3)  β
12   -0.028 0.138 0.810 
(Ln Labor)
2    γ
11   -0.005 0.005 0.334 
(Ln Land)
2    γ
22   -0.111 0.024 0.002 
(Ln Capital)
2    γ
33   0.054 0.126 0.707 
(Ln IC)
2 γ
44   -0.241 0.029 0.000 
(Ln Labor) x (Ln Land)  γ
12   0.083 0.049 0.172 
(Ln Labor) x (Ln Capital)  γ
13   0.015 0.017 0.419 
(Ln Labor) x (Ln IC)  γ
14   -0.103 0.037 0.137 
 (Ln Land) x (Ln Capital)  γ
23   -0.086 0.043 0.040 
 (Ln Land) x (Ln IC)  γ
24   -0.031 0.053 0.573 
 (Ln Capital) x (Ln IC)  γ
34   -0.013 0.017 0.473 
(Ln Y1/Y3) x (Ln Labor)  ω
11   0.053 0.044 0.423 
(Ln Y1/Y3) x (Ln Land)  ω
12   0.090 0.050 0.094 
(Ln Y1/Y3) x (Ln Capital)  ω
13   -0.006 0.042 0.892 
(Ln Y1/Y3) x (Ln IC)  ω
14   -0.021 0.071 0.776 
(Ln Y2/Y3) x (Ln Labor)  ω
21   0.043 0.102 0.585 
(Ln Y2/Y3) x (Ln Land)  ω
22   0.021 0.025 0.439 
(Ln Y2/Y3) x (Ln Capital)  ω
23   -0.040 0.041 0.356 
(Ln Y2/Y3) x (Ln IC)  ω
24   0.095 0.081 0.398 
Inefficiency Effect               
Intercept  δ
0   -1.642 0.884 0.079 
Workers’ Wage   δ
1   -1.830 0.882 0.012 
Workers’ Wage x Labor Intensity  δ
2   0.323 0.227 0.105 
Participation in Association’s Activities  δ
3   -0.324 0.094 0.000 
EU Standards   δ
4   0.609 0.289 0.090 
Publicity of Social Concerns  δ
5   0.248 0.220 0.262 
Time dummy 2002   δ
7   0.359 0.247 0.067 
Time dummy 2003  δ
8   0.204 0.281 0.484 
Ln Y1/Y3  δ
9   0.168 0.175 0.323 
Ln Y2/Y3  δ
10   1.159 0.280 0.000 





Figure 1. Technical efficiency distribution  
 
6. Conclusions  
  
Structural changes in transition economies have been analyzed from various perspectives. This paper 
brings into the discussion the role of organizational legitimacy, defined as the congruence between the 
firm’s behavior and social norms, values, or beliefs. The neo-institutional approach in organization theory 
disputes that firms are motivated to seek legitimacy to secure legitimate access to scarce resources and to 
enjoy legitimacy-accompanying economic gains. Empirical results from Czech agriculture confirm 
economic gains from legitimacy efforts in the form of technical efficiency when these efforts respond to 
societal values but not norms. These gains were found to be related to accessibility to agricultural land, 
investment subsidies and firm internal social capital, depending on the targeted stakeholders’ group. In the 
case of norms, the provision of public or other societally-valued goods seems to be expected and 
necessary for generating shareholders support, but has no direct economic gains. This appears to 
especially concern larger, less reorganized agricultural enterprises which, through gaining stakeholders' 
support, preserve their organization and possibly prevent their disintegration. More reorganized 
enterprises which have less experience and facilities for the provision of public goods, forgo the gains 
from legitimacy and choose to secure their future competitiveness with efficient managerial practices and 
technological investments. This evidence of the trade-off between gains from reorganization and 
legitimacy thus brings a new perspective to the understanding of structural changes, particularly regarding 
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